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broadly, however, Lake introduces the possibility that the Kentucky
Court of Appeals is de-emphasizing the policy of finality in favor of
justice. Regardless of which of these competing interests is emphasized,
the Court should thoughtfully balance them rather than mechanically
follow the "law of the case" doctrine. When faced with a situation
similar to Lake, it should welcome the opportunity to correct its past
mistakes instead of attempting to camouflage them in its rationale of
the case. Only when this is done will the "law of the case" doctrine
serve any useful purpose in Kentucky law.
Michael McGraw

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-A SURVEY OF COMMUTING
DEDUCTIONS UNDER § 162 OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE AND THE RAMIFICATIONS
OF UNITED STATES V. CORRELL
The scope of this comment is specifically limited to the deductibility
of commuting expenses where a taxpayer drives to work, and returns
to his residence that same day. The cases to be discussed are those in
which the taxpayer has incurred only transportation expenses as
distinguished from situations in which transportation as well as meals
and lodging are involved. The statutory language in the commuting
area is very general,' and subjecting this problem to judicial scrutiny
has resulted in confusion and divergent treatment among taxpayers. 3
SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162, TIRADE On BusnEss ExPENsEs.

(a) In General.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals
and lodging...) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business....
2 Some of the confusion in this area may be because of the generally small
amounts involved in the taxpayer's claim which limit the attorney's research time.
a Compare Gregorio Castillo, 1971-87 Tax Ct. Mem. (April 26, 1971) with
Donald W. Fausner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971). On identical facts Fausner was allowed
a portion of his commuting expenses because he was required to carry his flight
bag and suitcase with him but Castillo's deduction was denied only because he
lived in the Ninth insteaa of the Second Circuit. (controlled by Sullivan v.
Comm'r. 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966)). Compare United States v. Tauferner,
407 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1969), with Edmerson v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 70-1263 (D.C. Wash. 1970). In these cases the courts reached opposite
results with respect to taxpayers who commuted to employment located in a
remote area. Compare Berhow v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 737 (D. Neb. 1968),
with William B. Turner, 56 T.C. No. 3 (April 8, 1971). Here the courts were
divided on the question of whether the taxpayers could deduct commuting when
working temporarily at a distant job site.
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The purpose of this comment is to survey the area of commuting in
general, with special emphasis on the effects of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Correll.4 The cases relevant to the commuting question will be examined with an attempt to separate the
entire body of case law into specific identifiable factual situations.
This conceptual breakdown should prove helpful to the practicing
attorney when faced with a specific "commuting" situation.
INTRODUCTION

The cost of going to and from an individual's place of employment
and residence is generally characterized as a non-deductible commuting expense.5 The following situations have not caused this basic
4 889 U.S. 299 (1967). In Correll the Court in approving the Commissioner's
"overnight rule" held meal expenses incurred on one-day trips were not deductible
under § 162(a) (2) as "away from home" expenses because the trip did not require
sleep5or rest.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.62-1(g); 1.62-2(e); 1.262-1(b)(5). Frank H. Sullivan,
1 B.T.A. 93 (1924); R. C. Musser, 3 B.T.A. 498 (1925); Charles H. Sachs, 6
B.T.A. 68 (1927); Abraham W. Ast, 9 B.T.A. 694 (1927); Walter M. Priddy, 43
B.T.A. 18 (1940); John C. Bruton, 9 T.C. 882 (1947); Charles E. Cashman, 9
T.C. 761 (1947); Beatrice H. Albert, 13 T.C. 129 and 15 T.C. 350 (1950); Willard
I. Thompson, 15 T.C. 609 (1950); Chester C. Hand, 16 T.C. 1410 (1951); Joseph
M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959); Lenke Marot, 39 T.C. 288 (1961); Leo M. Verner,
39 T.C. 749 (1963); Arthur Sansone, 41 T.C. 277 (1963); Clinton H. Mitchell,
42 T.C. 953 (1964); Margaret Galotta Sheldon, 50 T.C. 214 (1968). Joseph J.
Bunevith, 52 T.C. 837 (1969); Jim O'Hare, 54 T.C. 874 (1970); Harold Gilburg,
55 T.C. 611 (1971); William B. Turner, 56 T.C. No. 3 (April 8, 1971); Barnhill
v. Commr, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945); William L. Heuer, Jr., 32 T.C. 947
(1959), aff'd 283 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950); Tidwell v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 864
4th Cir. 1962 ; Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962); Clarence J.
Sapp, 309 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'g 36 T.C. 852 (1961); Steinhort v.
Comm'r, 835 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1968); Smith v. Warren, 388 F.2d 671 (9th Cir.
1968) (per curiam); United States v. Tauferner, 407 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1969);
Hess v. United States, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 71-1446 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Kan., May
3, 1971); Sanders v. Comm'r, 439 F.2d 2.96 (9th Cir. 1971); Brightwell v. United
States, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 71-440 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Ariz., Jan. 5, 1971); Waters F.
Burrows 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 959 (1947); Edmond A. McMorris, 10 CCH Tax Ct
Mem. 518 (1951);Clarence J. Atkinson, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 865 (1957);
George Daniels, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 944 (1957); Sam Sciume, 17 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 74 (1958); Claude Walker, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 983 (1959); Robert D.
Steele, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 966 (1960); Robert H. Bodholdt, 20 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 390 (1961); Clarence H. O'Donnell, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 609 (1962);
George Riscalla, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 541 (1963); Neil M. Kelly, 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 472 (1964); Ewell L. Teer, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 493 (1964); Maxwell R. Lenington, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1350 (1966); Robert L. Schmidt, 26
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 93 (1967); James Louis Stafford, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 394
(1968); Marvin Scheitel, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 882 (1968); Margaret E.
Hodgkinson, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 865 (1968); Constance L. Gates, 28 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1049 (1969); George Thacker, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1433
(1969); Virgil Q. Pemberton, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 875 (1970); James P.
Marzano, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 694 (1970); Irvin 0. Christ, 29 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 510 (1970); Max C. Tietjen, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 281 (1970); Eugene
G. Fiestman, 1971-137 Tax Ct. Mem. (June 15, 1971), Glen H. Morton, 1971-156
Tax Ct. Mem. (June 30, 1971); D. L. Crowson, 1971-223 Tax Ct. Mem. (Aug. 31,
1971); Belle M. Cogan, 1971-230 Tax Ct. Mem. (Sept. 8, 1971). Mary L.
Roberts, 1971-282 Tax Ct. Mem. (Nov. 3, 1971).
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principle to be altered: when public transportation is unavailable; 6
when the taxpayer is subject to emergency calls; 7 where the husband
and wife work in different cities;8 when the expenses are necessitated
by physical disability;9 or even where a great distance must be
traveled. 10 In Frank H. Sullivan" the Board of Tax Appeals, following
English precedent 2 and Internal Revenue Service Solicitors Memorandum 1048,1 established the American judicial doctrine that commuting is a non-deductible personal expense which results from the
14
taxpayer's choice of residence and not the exigencies of his business.
However, as will be seen, if a business purpose can be attributed
to the trip, the deduction may be allowed. 15 Before discussing these
"commuting" cases the relevant statutory provisions will be examined

in detail.
STATUTORY PATrEN

As noted above, commuting is generally a non-deductible personal

expense. However, when intimately related to business, commuting
6

Robert Bodholdt, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 390 (1961); Clarence L. Atkinson,
16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 865 (1957); George Daniels, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 865
(1957); Sam Sciume, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 74 (1958).
7 Clarence J.Sapp, 309 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'g 36 T.C. 852 (1961);
Lenke Marot, 36 T.C. 238 (1961); Robert L. Schmidt, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 93
(1967); Margaret G. Sheldon, 50 T.C. 24 (1968); Constance L. Gates, 28 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1049 (1969); James O'Hare, 54 T.C. 874 (1970).
8
Robert A. Coerver, 36 T.C. 252 (1961), aff'd 297 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 1962).
9 James Donnelly, 28 T.C. 1278 (1957), aff'd 262 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959);
Charles E. Cashman, 9 T.C. 761 (1947); John C. Bruton, 9 T.C. 882 (1947).
'0 Darrell Spear Courtney, 82 T.C. 334 (1959).
111 B.T.A. 93 (1924).
12 Cook v. Knott, 2 Gr. Brit. Tax Cases 246, 4 T.L.R. 164 (1887); Revell v.
Directors, etc., 3 Gr. Brit. Tax Cases 12, LV Justice of the Peace 392 (1890).
13 Sol. Mem. 1048, 1 Cum. BuLL. 101 (1919):
Obviously an individual is free to fix his residence wherever he
chooses. He fixes it according to his personal convenience and inclinations,
as a matter separate and apart from business. Any expense, therefore,
incident to such residence as fixed by the individual is a matter personal to
him. If he prefers, for personal reasons, to live in a different city from that
in which his business or employment is located, any expense incident to so
doing is the result of decision based on personal convenience and preference, and it is not the result of anything undertaken for business purposes
and, therefore, is not a business expense.
Sol. Mem. 1048 was declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 CuM.
BULL. 307.
14 Comm'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945); Joseph J.Bunevith, 52 T.C. 837
(1969); Harold Gilburg, 55 T.C. 611 (1971); Maurice Wills, 48 T.C. 308 (1967),
aff'd 411 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1969).
15 Commuting expenses have been held deductible in Sullivan v. Comm'r, 368
F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966) (taxpayer carrying tools); Joseph H. Sherman, 16 T.C.
332 (1957) (taxpayer with two places of employment); Wright v. Hartsell, 305
F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962) (worksite in remote area); Carlson v. Wright, 181 F.
Supp. 568 (D.C. Idaho 1959) (taxpayer resides centrally to several distant worksites); Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962) (employment is
temporary).
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expenses are deductible under § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 which states:
(a) In General.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business including(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for
meals and lodging...) while away from home in the pursuit of a
trade or business ....
Although failure to qualify under § 162 is a sufficient basis upon which
to justify disallowance of the deduction, the courts also frequently
allude to § 26216 (which disallows deductions for personal expenses) to
further support their conclusion that the expense should be nondeductible. Thus these sections overlap to the extent that a personal
expense disallowed under § 262 is the antithesis of a business expense
which would be allowed under § 162.17 Although § 262 disallows
personal expenses, it is limited to the disallowance of those personal
expenses for which a deduction is not "otherwise expressly provided," s
and therefore an expense may be personal in naRire and still be
deductible because of an intimate relation to business. 19 For example,
although commuting is generally a non-deductible personal expense,
carrying tools may be sufficiently related to carrying on a business so
that the expense will be allowed under § 162(a).
In order that the statutory scheme be complete, the interrelation of
§ 162 and § 62 must be considered. Section 6220 lists all types of
16 INT. Pev. CODE OF 1954, § 262. PrMSONAL, LiviN,

AND FAMMLY EXPENSES.
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction
shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.
Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (b) (5).
The taxpayer's cost of commuting to his place of business or employment are personal expenses and do not qualify as deductible expenses.
174A MERTENS,

LAw OF F.EnEAL INcoME TAXATION

§ 25.17 n.66.

See

Dobres, Employee's Expenses in Earning Salary, 20 N.Y.U. TAX INsT. 119 (1962);
Kleet, Jr., Disallowed Employee's Expenses, 17 N.Y.U. TAX INsT. 147 (1959).
18 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
19
Cases cited note 15 supra.
20
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 62. ADjusTE GRoss INcoim DEFINED.
[T]he term 'adjusted gross income means . . . gross income minus the

following deductions.
(1) Trade and business deductions.-The deductions allowed by this
chapter... which are attributable to a trade or business carried on by the
taxpayer, if such trade or business does not consist of the performance
of services by the taxpayer as an employee.
(2) Trade or business deductions of employees.(B) Expenses for travel away from home.-The deductions
allowed by part VI (sec. 161 and following) which consist of

(Continued on next page)
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21
expenditures which are allowed in computing adjusted gross income.

Any items not listed in § 62 must be deducted in computing taxable
income under § 63.22 Section 162 provides the substantive requirements which must be satisfied in order to deduct transportation expenses.P Once a particular expense qualifies under § 162, it must
next be determined whether or not it may be allowed in computing
adjusted gross income under § 62.24 There are two major corresponding subdivisions in § 162 and in § 62 which must be considered.
First, § 162(a) 25 allows transportation expenses incurred in the taxpayer's metropolitan or "home" area to be deducted as general business
expenses. 26 Under § 162(a) the expenses must be "ordinary and

necessary" 27 and incurred in "carrying on a trade or business." 2
Expenditures which meet the § 162(a) requirements of deductibility
are allowed in computing adjusted gross income by virtue of the
corresponding provisions in §§ 62(2) (B)

and 62(1).29

Second,

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

expenses of travel, meals, and lodging while away from home, paid
or incurred by the taxpayer in connection with the performance by
him of services as an employee.
(C) Transportation expenses.-The deductions allowed by part
VI (sec. 161 and following) which consist of expenses of transportation paid or incurred by the taxpayer in connection with the
performance by him of services as an employee.
21
Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(b):
Section 62 merely specifies which deduction shall be allowed in
computing
adjusted gross income. It does not create any new deductions.
22
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 63.
23 See notes 1 supra and 27, 28, 31, 32, and accompanying text infra.
24 This catagorization is significant in two respects. First, deductions from
adjusted gross income may only be taken in lieu of the standard deduction. See
e.g., Frank Fisher, 24 T.C. 1118 (1954). Second, the adjusted gross income
figure is used in computing the amount of certain deductions (medical expenses
§ 213, charitable contributions § 170, child care § 214, amount of the standard
deduction § 141).
25 Note 1 supra.
26
Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(g).
27
Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(g). Rev. Rul. 58-479, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 60. "Ordinary and necessary" have been defined as follows:
(1) An expense is 'ordinary,' within the meaning of these statutory provisions, where the expense is common and accepted in the general industry
or type of activity in which the taxpayer is engaged; and (2) An expense is 'necessary' where it is appropriate and helpful in furthering the
taxpayer's business. . . . Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Ordinary and
Necessary Business Expense, 42 TAxEs 808 (1964).
See 4A MEanmNs, THE LAw OF FEDRmL INcoM TAXATION §§ 25.09, 25A.05;
Boehm, Ordinary and Necessary Expenses: Proximate Relationshipas a Rejuvenated
Test 2for
,Ev. 1 (1961).
8 Deductibility, 30 U. Chic. L.
Definition of "trade or business" is more limited than merely engaged in
activity for profit. It has been defined as "holding one's self out to others as
engaged in the selling of goods or services". Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488
(1940) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring). For purposes of § 162 an employee
is considered to be engaged in a trade or business. Noland v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d
108 (4th Cir. 1959); Thomas v. Patterson, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1961); Trent
v. Comm'r, 291 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1961).
29 Note 20 supra.
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§ 162(a) (2) allows transportation costs incurred away from the taxpayer's residence or principle post of duty to be deducted as "away
from home" expenses.8 0 Under § 162(a)(2) the expenses must be

"reasonable and necessary" traveling expenses 31 incurred in the "pur-

suit of a trade or business," 32 and in addition be expended "while
away from home." 33 Section 162(a) (2) type expenditures are allowed
in computing adjusted gross income by virtue of §§ 62(2)(B) and
62(1). 34
The first "commuting" cases to be discussed are those which have
arisen under the § 162(a) general business expense provisions. These
cases involve transportation expenses incurred within the taxpayer's
"home" area. They are: (1) where the taxpayer must commute to
work and carry his tools, and (2) when the taxpayer has more than
one place of employment within his general area of employment and
must drive between various locations during his work day. The second
group of cases have arisen under § 162(a) (2) and involve commuting
expenses incurred while "away from home" on one-day trips. They
include: (1) various places of employment located in different cities,
(2) employment located in a remote area where living quarters are
unavailable, (3) residence centrally located to various employment

locations, and (4) temporary employment. The ultimate question in
these latter cases has been the definition of "home" within the meaning
of § 162(a) (2). In order to obtain a deduction under these exceptions
to the "commuter rule," the taxpayer must persuade the court that his
residence is his "tax home," so that all transportation away from his

residence will be "away from home."

30 Note 1 supra.
This is substantially the same requirement as the "ordinary and necessary"
test under § 162(a). Note 27 supra. "Reasonable and necessary" is construed to
mean "appropriate or "helpful." Rev. Rul. 64-272, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 55; Rev.
Rul. 63-275, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 85. See Comm'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945).
32 The expense must be incurred in pursuit of business. This means that there
must be a direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying on of the
trade or business of the taxpayer or of his employer. Maurice Wills, 48 T.C. 308
(1967), aff'd 411 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1969). See Commr v. Flowers, 326 U.S.
465 (1945); Cyril K. Chappuis, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 222 (1968).
33 The commissioner has consistently defined "home" as the taxpayer's principle post of duty. Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960 Cum. BuLL. 60- I.T. 1490, 1-2 Cum.
Bull. 89 (1922). In Comm'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945) & Peurifoy v.
Comm'r, 358 U.S. 59 (1958), the Supreme Court declined to define the meaning
of "home" in § 162(a)(2). Comm'r v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967) upheld the
commissioner's definition with respect to military personal abroad. "Home' can
include the taxpayer's metropolitan area; Amoroso v. Comm'r, 193 F.2d 583 (1st
Cir. 1952), cert. den. 343 U.S. 926 (1952); Rev. Rul. 55-236, 1955-1 Cum. BULL.
274.
34 Note 20 supra. Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(e).
31

COMMENTS
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TooLs-§ 162(a)

When the taxpayer is required to carry tools to work in his automobile, at least some portion of his commuting expense may be
deductible. The conceptual notion involved here is that the taxpayer
may be said to be "carrying on a trade or business" within the meaning
of § 162(a) from the time he departs from his residence with a carload
of tools, instead of his job beginning when he arrives at his worksite.
The original position of the Internal Revenue Service with respect to
deductibility of tool transportation expenses was announced in Revenue
Ruling 56-25 where the service stated that commuting expenses were
nondeductible notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer also carried
tools.3 5 The first case to express a view contrary to this principle was
Charles T. Crowther.3$ In Crowther3 7 and cases following, the Tax
Court allowed a deduction for the portion of the expense allocable to
the transportation of bulky tools since the necessity of carrying tools
prevented possible use of cheaper transportation.3 8 In Rice V. Ridde3 9
a federal district court allowed a full deduction for transportation
expenses incurred by a musician who carried several bulky instruments.40 The court reasoned that since he would not have driven to
work but for the necessity of carrying his musical instruments the entire
automobile expense should be allowed. The Internal Revenue Service
in Revenue Ruling 63-10041 based on facts similar to Rice, modified
3

5Rev. Rul. 56-25, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 152.

The expenses incurred by an employee in using his automobile for
commuting between his place of abode and his place of work... represent non-deductible personal expenses within the purview of section 262
.notwithstanding the fact that the automobile is also used to transport
tools used by the employee in his work.
T.C. 1293 (1957).
3628
37
On appeal the Ninth Circuit allowed the entire expense but based the
296 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959).
decision
3 8 on other factors. Crowther v. Comm'r,
Francis Eaton, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 52 (1958) (mechanic allowed a
deduction for tool transportation); Henry P. Canclini, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 956
(1957) & Benjamin C. Allenby, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 794 (1957) (loggers
allowed deduction for tool transportation); Contra, Ewell L. Teer, 83 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 545 (1964) (self-employed nurse denied deduction for transporting nursing
equipment); Clarence H. O'Donnell 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 609 (1962) (deduction denied pilot who carried flight bag to airport).
39
4 0 179 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
But see, Teague v. Riddell, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5190 (S.D. Cal. 1959)
(deduction denied musician because his costs were not increased by transportation
violin).
of bass
41
Rev. Rul. 63-100, 163-1 Cum. BuLL. 34. Automobile expense of musician
transporting his instruments between home and place of work are deductible if
instruments are too bulky to be carried otherwise, and he would not use automobile except for that reason.
The Tax Court in James A. Kistler, 40 T.C. 657 (1963), held that only the
excess transportation cost allocable to the musical instruments and not the entire
transportation cost is deductible. This opinion was subsequently withdrawn.
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their position in Revenue Ruling 56-2542 following Rice to the extent
that if the taxpayer would not have driven his automobile to work but
for the necessity of carrying tools, the commuting deduction should
be allowed. Subsequently the Second Circuit in Sullivan v. Commissione)4 3 went beyond Revenue Ruling 63-100 4 and allowed a construction worker to deduct that portion of his commuting expense
which the taxpayer could show was allocable to the transportation of
tools, even if he would have driven to work had it not been necessary
to transport tools. Thus, even if public transportation is unavailable
and the taxpayer would have driven to work in any event, he is nevertheless entitled to a partial deduction when he carries tools. The
Second Circuit gave no indication of how to make the allocation
between deductible and nondeductible commuting, and on remand the
Tax Court held without explanation that the taxpayer was entitled to
deduct one-third of his automobile expense. 45
The decision in Sullivan was soon followed by the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Tyne v. Commissioner,46 which approved the even if test
of Sullivan. On remand of Tyne, the Tax Court again held without
explanation, that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct 50% of the
transportation expenses incurred. The taxpayer appealed, but the
even if theory was abandoned and the Seventh Circuit held that he
would be entitled to a full deduction if he could prove that he would
not have driven to work but for the necessity of transporting tools. 47
Despite Sullivan and the first Tyne decision the Tax Court has
42

Rev. Rd. 56-25, 1956-1 Gum. BuLLr. 152, is modified to remove the imlficadion that such expenses would not be deductible even if the employee would not
have used his automobile on such trips but for the necessity of taking his tools
with him. Rev. Rul, 63-100, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 34.
43 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966), revg and remg 45 T.C. 217 (1965).
4 Note 41 supra.
45
Lawrence D. Sullivan, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 71 (1968), aff'd 69-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9448 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 827 (1969).

There are several possibilities for developing guidelines for allocating

transportation expenses.

First, a predetermined percentage might be

established which would be applicable in all tool transportation deduction
cases. A second method would be to allow the taxpayer to deduct the
expense of having the tools carried by a delivery service if such expense
did not exceed the total cost of transportation. A third possibility would

be to allow a deduction based on the proportionate weight of the tools

to the total weight of the tools and the taxpayers. 4 SAN DEGo L. REV.
323, 327 n. 17 (1967).
In Arnold T. Anderson, 55 T.C. 756 (1971), the Tax Court held that a taxpayer carrying bulky tools too heavy for public transportation may deduct
automobile expenses exceeding the cost of public transportation.
463 85 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1967), revg and rem'g 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1112
(1966).
47
Tyne v. Comm'r, 409 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g and rem'g an
unreported Tax Court decision.
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refused to follow the even if allocation. 48 The Tax Court reasoned
against the even if test by stating that if the taxpayer would have
driven to work in any event his costs are not increased by transporting
tools and no deduction should be allowed. 49 However, in Donald
Fausnei10 where a pilot carried his flight bag to work, the court
accepted the even if rule since that case arose in the Second Circuit
and was controlled by Sullivan.51 The Tax Court has also held in
Arnold T. Anderson,52 contrary to the second Tyne decision, that it
will not allow a full deduction even where the taxpayer would not have
driven to work but for the necessity of carrying tools. The court was
of the opinion that only expenses above and beyond those which the
taxpayer would otherwise ordinarily incur in commuting should be
deductible. Thus, if the taxpayer normally rode the bus he would
subtract the usual bus fare from his automobile expense when computing the amount of his deduction.
Two PLACES OF EmpLOYME

-§ 162 (a)

The taxpayer who has two employment locations within his general
area of employment is allowed a deduction for transportation costs
incurred in going from one business location to another.53 This is not
a pure exception to the "commuter rule" since the taxpayer is driving
between businesses and not between his residence and business. The
deductions allowed here are only those incurred in going from one
business or employment location to another, and not those incurred
in commuting between one's residence and business. For example, in
Robert B. Steele 4 a building inspector was allowed to deduct costs of
transportation between various buildings he inspected but was denied
a deduction for commuting from his residence to the first location
inspected and expenses from the last location he inspected to his
residence. Thus, if the taxpayer reports to various employment loca48 Samuel D. Woolsey, 1972-38 Tax Ct. Mem. (Feb. 16, 1972); Robert
Hitt, 55 T.C. 628 (1971); Harold Gilburg, 55 T.C. 611 (1971); John E.
Scott, 1971-158 Tax Ct. Mem. (July 1, 1971); Stanley E. Baily, 1971-107
Tax Ct. Mem. (May 17, 1971); Gregorio Castillo, 1971-87 Tax Ct. Mem. (April
26, 1971).
491d.
5O 55 T.C. 620 (1971).
51 Subsequently, the taxpayer in Fausner, was again in court litigating over

different taxable
Taxjurisdiction
Court denied
theSecond
deduction,
because
in the
W.
he had years,
movedand
out the
of the
of the
Circuit.
Donald
meantime
Fausner, 1971-277 Tax Ct. Mem. (Oct. 28, 1971).
52 55 T.C. 756 (1971). Cf. Harold Gillburg, 55 T.C. 611 (1971); Robert Hitt,
55 T.C. 628 (1971); Gregorio Castillo, 1971-87 Tax Ct. Mem. (April 26, 1971).
53 Alvah I. Winslow, 28 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1978 (19634); Rev. Rul. 63-82,
1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 33; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 60; Rev. Rul. 55-109,
1955-1 Cum. BUr.L. 261. But see, Larry N. Kutchinskd, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 216

(1968).

54 19

CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 966 (1960). See cases cited note 56 infra.
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tions throughout his work area but does not visit at least two on the
same day, no deduction is allowed. 5 This result is achieved because
the expenses of the trip to work and return to residence are nondeductible commuting expenses. 56
EFFECrS OF UNrTED STATES V. CoRmu

In United States v. Corre157 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that meal expenses which were incurred on one-day
business trips away from the taxpayers residence but did not keep him
away "overnight" were not deductible as "away from home" expenses
under § 162(a) (2).5s8 In so holding, the Court sustained the validity
of the Commissioner's so called "overnight rule,"50 which provides
that a trip must require sleep or rest in order for the travel expenses
to be deductible under the "away from home" provisions of § 162(a)(2).
Since in Correll the taxpayer was not "away from home" within the
meaning of the "overnight rule" his meal expenses were held nondeductible. Unfortunately recent Tax Court cases 60 have held that
Coriell precludes the deduction of one-day trip transportation costs
under § 162(a) (2). However, the application of the "overnight rule"
to transportation costs as distinguished from meals and lodging may
be unjustified. In light of Correll it is necessary to consider the
applicability of the "overnight rule" to transportation costs incurred
on one-day trips before discussing the "commuting cases" arising
under § 162(a)(2).
The Correll decision held that a taxpayer on a one-day trip is not
permitted to deduct his meal expenses. However, the transportation
issue was not before the Court in Correll and the decision cannot
be regarded as controlling on the question of whether the "overnight
rule" applies to one-day trip transportationexpenses. This is supported
5

5 It is generally recognized that transportation to and from work within the

taxpayer's general metropolitan area is nondeductible commuting. Amoroso v.

Comm'r, 193 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1952); Joseph M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959);
R. C.56Musser, 3 B.T.A. 498 (1925); Rev. Rul. 55-236, 1955-1 GUm. Bu .. 274.

Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 261. Steinhort v. Comm'r, 335 F.2d
496 (5th Cir. 1964); Smith v. Warren, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 631 (W.D. Wash.
1967), affd 388 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1968); Heuer v. Comm'r, 32 T.C. 947 (1959),
aff'd 283 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1960); (river boat pilots denied expense of traveling
to various assignments from residence, but granted portion of such expense
attributable to traveling between assignments). See Sapp v. Comm'r, 309 F.2d
143 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'g 36 T.C. 852 (1961).
7 89 U.S. 299 (1967).
58 INT.RFv. CoDE oF 1954, § 162(a) (2).
59 Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 75, 78.
60 William B. Turner 56 T.C. No. 3 (April 8,1971); Sanders v. Comm'r, 439
F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'g 52 T.C. 964 (1969), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3157 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (No.70-185); United States v.Tauferner, 407 F.2d
243 (10th Cir. 1969); Virgil Q. Pemberton, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 875 (1970).
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by some of the rationale for the holding which suggests a contrary
result when transportation expenses are at issue. The Court stated
that § 162(a) (2) "speaks of 'meals and lodging' as a unit, suggesting
• . . that Congress contemplated .

.

-,61 a meal deduction only when

lodging is involved. 62 No comparable argument is available in the case
3
of transportation expenses.
The Correll Court also stated that the enactment of the 1954 Code
subsequent to the Commissioner's promulgation of the "overnight rule"
indicated Congressional approval thereof.6 4 This reasoning is in
accordance with the conclusion that the "overnight rule" does not
apply when one-day trip commuting expenses are involved. This conclusion follows for the reason that when the 1954 Code was adopted,
the courts had held 5 that these costs could be deducted in arriving
at adjusted gross income under the "away from home" provisions of
§ 22(n) of the 1939 Code.66 Having reached this result in Kenneth
Waters67 the Tax Court stated:
Surely it would be absurd to say that an employee who flies from
Boston to Washington on business and returns to Boston the same
day is not entitled to the deduction, but that if he takes two days
for the whole trip, he is entitled to the deduction. 68
In Joseph M. Winn, 9 the Tax Court followed Waters with reference
to transportation expenses but held that the "overnight rule" precluded
a deduction for meals. In Revenue Ruling 60-14770 the Internal
Revenue Service acquiesced, stating that transportation costs incurred
on one-day trips arising under § 22(n) of the 1939 Code would subsequently be allowed in computing adjusted gross income.71
612 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 304 (1967).
O See Joseph M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959); Alan L. Hanson, 85 T.C. 413,
remad Hanson v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1962); Conm'~r v. Bagley,
374 F.2d 204, 207 n.10 (Ist Cir. 1967).
63 IN.. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(2).
64 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305 (1967).
6
5 Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (1949); Scott v. Kelm, 110 F. Supp. 819
(D.C. Minn. 1953); Horace E. Podems, 24 T.C. 21 (1955); Sumnmerour v. Allen, 99
F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ga. 1951); Long v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 214 (1955);

Chandler v. Comm'r, 226 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955); Joseph M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220
(1959).
6
19 NTr. REv. CODE oF 1939, § 22(n).
6712 T.C. 414 (1949).
68 Id. at 417.
6932
T.C. 220 (1959).
70
Rev. Rul. 60-147, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 682.
Internal Revenue Service will no longer litigate cases arising
under section 22(n) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 where an
employee incurs transportation expenses (as distinguished from the cost
of meals and lodging) on business trips which take him outside his home
area but do not keep him away from home overnight. Rev. Rul. 60-147,
71The

1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 682.
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When the 1954 Code was adopted § 22(n) was carried over as
§ 62(2)(B) and § 62(2)(C) was added. 72 The Committee Reports
suggest that the purpose of the addition was to allow transportation
expenses incurred while not "away from home" to be deducted in
computing adjusted gross income.73 The Tax Court in William B.
Turner7 4 has recently clandestinely intimated that the addition of §
62(2)(C) exhibits a congressional intent to exclude one-day trip
transportation expenses from deductibility under the "away from
home" provision. However, the legislative history demonstrates that
the addition of 62(2)(C) was not intended to limit the 162(a)(2)62(2) (B) "away from home" provision to situations in which the trip
is an "overnight" one, but was only added in order to allow employees
an adjusted gross income deduction for metropolitan area transportation costs. 75

There is a substantial amount of precedent supporting the view
that the "overnight rule" does not apply to the one-day trip transportation situation. 76 The decisions arising under the 1939 Code reaching
this conclusion held that the "overnight rule" did not apply to preclude
deductions under § 22(n). 77 The decisions arising under the 1954
Code ordinarily allowed the deductions under § 162(a) (2) without
discussing the applicability of the "overnight rule."78 The courts have
recently, on the basis of Correll, abandoned these precedents and
held § 162(a) (2) inapplicable to the one-day trip situation. 79 As
suggested above such a result is probably beyond the scope of the
holding in Correll. After finding the § 162(a) (2) "away from home"
provisions inapplicable because of Correl, the courts have looked to
the § 162(a) s9 general business expense provisions as a basis for the
deduction. Since there is no precedent under § 162(a) the expenses
72 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954).
73
fBecause these expenses, when incurred, usually are substantial, it
appears desirable to treat employees in this respect like self-employed
persons. ... Thus, employees will be able to deduct business transportation expenses and still use the standard deduction. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954).
74 56 T.C. No. 3 (April 8, 1971).
75 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1954).
76 Cases cited notes 65 supra and 78 infra.
77 Cases cited note 65 supra.
78 Carlson v. Wright, 181 F. Sup. 568 (D. Idaho 1959); Wright v. Hartsell,
805 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962). Crowther v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959);

Mathews v. Comm' r 310 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962). But in Emmert v. United States,
322 (S.D. Ind. 1955), the court specifically refused to follow the
F. Supp.
"146
overnight
rule"
with respect to transportation costs. Nor was one judge . . . to
be penalized on the basis that he is a commuter because he has chosen to
travel almost daily between his home and the court."
79 Cases cited note 60 supra.
80
INr. l~v. ConE or 1954, § 162(a), note 1 supra.
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have been routinely disallowed 8l without discussion of the possibility
of applying the exceptions to the "commuter rule" previously developed under § 162(a) (2).82 Assuming that this construction of Correll
is correct there seems to be no reason why the courts should not apply
these judicially created exceptions to § 162(a) in order to reflect the
policy of allowing all business related expenditures to be deducted,
instead of abruptly abandoning these § 162(a) (2) precedents with

respect to one-day trip transportation costs.
Two PL~cEs

OF

Busnsmss

OR EMPLOYmENT-§

162(a) (2)

Where the taxpayer has two places of business or employment, one
of which is located in a city or area outside of his general metropolitan

area, he is entitled to a § 162(a) (2) "away from home" expense
deduction for transportation costs incurred in driving between them.
This is to be distinguished from the situation arising under § 162(a),
which allows deductions of transportation expenses incurred by the
taxpayer in getting from one business or employment location to

another within his general metropolitan or "tax home" area. Thus,
when state supreme court justices are required by law to maintain their
residence in a particular district of the state, and the court sits in a
distant city, the taxpayer is allowed a deduction for his transportation
expenses incurred in driving to and from his residence. 3 A similar
situation arises where the taxpayer has a business in a distant city
and also a business in the city of his residence,8 4 as in Joseph H. Sher81 See supra, note 60.
82 The main exceptions are (1) remote area and temporary employment,
Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962), (2) central location of
residence to worksite, Carlson v. Wright, 181 F. Supp. 568 (D. Idaho 1959).
These were allowed under the "away from home" provisions of § 162(a) (2) and
were exceptions to the rule that "home" was the principle post of duty of the
taxpayer. What the courts were really dciding was that the expenses were due
to the exigencies of business and should be deductible. See CarIson v. Wright,
Idaho 1959). The Internal Revenue Service has recognized
568that
(D. these
F. Supp.
181
in specific
cases
exceptions should apply to one day trip transportation
INcosts. See INTRNAL= REVENU SEIcE PUBLICATION No. 17, Yotm FEDERL
corx TAX 57 (1972 ed.); Rev. Rdl. 53-190, 1953-2 G .BUr.L. 303; Rev. Rul.
55-109, 1955-1 GUM. Bur.L. 261; Rev. Rd. 54-497, 1954-2 GUM. BULL. 75.
B3 United States v.LeBlanc, 278 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1950); Emmert v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1956); Moss v. United States, 145 F. Supp.
10 (W.D.S.C. 1955). But see Barnhil v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945)
(no constitutional requirement that justices continue to reside in district from
which elected). See also Rev. Rul. 63-82, 1963-1 Cum.BuLL. 33.
See Rev. Rul. 61-67, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 25, modifying I.T. 3842, 1947-1
Cum.
84BULL. 11 (concerning members of state legislatures).
Chandler v.Comm'r 226 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955); Dave Rubin, 26 T.C.
1076, reo'd on other grounds, 252 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1958); Joseph H. Sherman,
16 T.C. 332 (1957); Joseph W. Powell, 34 B.T.A. 655, aff'd 94 F.2d 483 (1st Cir.
1938); Walter F. Brown, 13 B.T.A. 832 (1928); Richard E. Benson, 27 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1555 (1968); Joseph P. Derry, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 969 (1954);
(Continued on next page)
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man,8 5 where the Tax Court held that when the taxpayer can establish
two geographically separate business locations, he is entitled to deduct
the transportation expenses incurred in commuting to the business
removed from the city of his residence.
REMOTE AREA

EMPLOYMENT-§ 162(a)(2)

When it is impossible for the taxpayer to reside near his job site
the expenses of commuting to and from the nearest habitation have
been deductible. 6 Wright v. Hartsell7 is the most often cited although
there were at least two cases recognizing this principle when Hartsell
was decided.18 In Hartsell the taxpayer drove 140 miles round trip
to and from a remote job site. To the extent the employment was
temporary, since he could not reasonably be expected to move his
residence to employment of a short duration, Hartsell was entitled
to a full deduction. However, when the employment became indefinite,
meaning that it was expected to continue for a substantial length of
time (usually more than one year), and the nearest he could live to
the site was 46 miles, the expenses of 92 miles of the round trip were
allowed. The court recognized it was the exigencies of business
rather than the taxpayer's personal choice which necessitated the
travel. 89 The Hartsell court compared the remote area situation to
that of the taxpayer with two widely separated jobs "who obviously
cannot live simultaneously in both localities."9 0 The court concluded
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Vincent Treanor, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 336 (1951). Contra, Robert A. Coerver,
36 T.C. 252 (1961), aff'd 297 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1962) (where husband and wife
had place of employment in different cities).
85 16 T.C. 332 (1957).
86 Mathews v. Comm'r, 310 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), rev'g 36
T.C. 483 (1961); Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962); Crowther v.
Comm'r 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959); Carlson v. Wright, 181 F. Supp. 568
(D.C. Idaho 1959). But see Sanders v. Comm'r, 439 F.2d 296 (1971), aff'g 52 T.C.
964
(1969),
denied, 40407U.S.L.W.
Cir. Oct.
1969).12, 1971) (No. 70-185);
(10th(U.S.
F.2d 2433141
States cert.
v. Tauferner,
United
81305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962).

8 8 Carlson v. Wright, 181 F. Supp. 568 (D.C. Idaho 1959) (deduction
allowed temporarily employed taxpayer who could reside no closer than 55 miles
from work site); Crowter v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959) (deduction
allowed logger who drove to various temporary logging sites). In Crowther the
taxpayer carried tools but in a later decision where a taxpayer drove to various

logging sites and did not carry tools the same court held the tool issue was not
essential to the Crowther decision and allowed the deduction. Mathews v.
Comm'r, 310 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), rev'g 36 T.C. 483 (1961).
89 Distinguishing Commr v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945), where the court
found the travel did result from the taxpayer's personal choice.
90 Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221, 225 (9th Cir. 1962). But see Raymond
A. Sanders, 52 T.C. 964 (1969) aff'd 439 F.2d 296 (1971), cert. denied, 40

U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (No. 70-185).
a taxpayer with
The cases under consideration are not cases involving
(Continued on next page)
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"that a taxpayer's inability to live near his job site is a valid ground
for the deduction as travel expense the resulting cost of his transportation. .
In Leo M. Verner92 commuting deductions were disallowed because the situation was not sufficiently analagous to Hartsell
as there was merely a scarcity of housing in the work area.03 The
Verner court distinguished the situation in that case as being quite
different from a work site located in the middle of a vast desert as in
Hartsell.9 4 More recently, in Sanders v. Commissioner,95 civilian employees who weren't allowed to live on a remote Government base
were denied deductions for automobile expenses incurred in traveling
to work from the nearest habitable community. The court distinguished the temporary employment situation in Hartsell since in
Sanders the employment was permanent. However, in Hartsell the
deduction was allowed for driving to the remote area when the
employment was indefinite, as well as when it was temporary.
Therefore, although for tax purposes there is a valid distinction
between temporary and indefinite employment, 96 there seems to be
no such distinction recognized between permanent and indefinite
employment, and the court's rationale in this respect appears erroneous.
The Sanders court also noted that Hartsell had been undermined by
the decision in Smith v. Warren 7 in which a deduction was denied
under § 162(a) to a ship pilot for expenses incurred in traveling
between his home and various piers at which he worked on the
Seattle waterfront. Although Smith did not involve a remote area it
was analogous in the sense that no matter how close to the waterfront
".."91

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

a temporary job; or a taxpayer with a permanent job and a temporary
assignment; or a taxpayer working in two widely separate localities; or a
public official who is required to maintain his residence in his home district but perform his official duties elsewhere.... 52 T.C. at 968.
Here we are concerned with "taxpayers with permanent places of employment
who commute regularly between residence and work." 52 T.C. at 968.
93
Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221, 225 (9th Cir. 1962).
9
2 39 T.C. 749 (1963).

93

See Arthur Sansone, 41 T.C. 271 (1963); James R. Whitaker, 24 T.C. 750
(1955); Willard S. Jones, 13 T.C. 880 (1949); Henry C. Warren, 13 T.C. 205
1949).
94 Leo M. Verner, 39 T.C. 749, 755 (1963).
95439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1971) (No. 70-185), aff'g 52 T.C. 964 (1969).
96 The theory of the temporary-indefinite rule is that when a taxpayer accepts
temporary employment away from his residence, he cannot reasonably be expected
to uproot his family and establish a place of residence near his employment, so his
residence is considered his "tax home" and the expenses are considered due to the
exigencies of business. Peurifoy v.Comm'r 358 U.S. 59 (1958); Wright v. Hartsell,
305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962); E.G. Leach, 12 T.C. 20 (1949); Harry F. Schurer,
3 T.C. 544 (1944). See Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 60 (one year limit
on "temporary assignment").
97 338 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1968).
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he moved, the taxpayer necessarily incurred automobile expenses in
going to work. Seemingly on this basis the Sanders court stated that
"Smith v. Warren impliedly rejected necessity as a principled basis of
an exception to the general rule that commuting expenses are nondeductible personal expenses."98 The court's analogy seems strained
since in Smith the taxpayer did not travel outside his regular work
area and the case merely stands for the generally accepted proposition
that driving to and from work within a taxpayer's regular work area
is a non-deductible commuting expense. 99 Thus, in Sanders the court
seems to be overreaching on this point and indicates a general willingness to disallow as commuting any expense of driving back and forth
to work.10 0 The Sanders court also relied on United States v. Tauferner,1' 1 in which deductions for commuting expenses were denied
a taxpayer residing 27 miles from his job site, even though his residence was located in the nearest habitable community. In Tauferner
as in Sanders the employment was permanent, however the principle
authority relied upon in both of these cases was United States v. Correll,10 2 which the Sanders court held precluded a remote area deduction under § 162(a) (2) because the taxpayer was not away from home
"overnight." Thus Correll defined "away from home" to exclude from
§ 162(a) (2) trips requiring neither sleep or rest. As previously discussed, 10 3 reading Correll as applying the "overnight rule" to one-day
trip transportationexpenses as distinguished from meals is dicta and
completely contrary to previous authority under § 162(a) (2). 104 The
courts in Tauferner and Sanders nevertheless abandoned previous
decisions in this area, most notedly Wright v. Hartsell,10 5 and reached
the seemingly unjustified conclusion that § 162(a) is the only possible
provision for deducting transportation expenses incurred on one-day
trips. As a result, the courts are now readily characterizing every trip,
notwithstanding impossibility of habitation or even temporary nature
98 Sanders v. Comm'r, 439 F.2d 296, 299 (1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3141 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (No. 70-185).
990 0Notes 54, 55, 56 and accompanying text supra.
'
The courts in recent cases seem to be abandoning the fundamental policy
of disallowing commuting only when there is an element of personal choice. For
early cases establishing this principle see Frank H. Sullivan, 1 B.T.A. 93 (1924),
and Comm'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945). Cases typical of the current attitude
are Sanders v. Comm'r, 439 F.2d 296 (1971), aff'g 52 T.C. 964 (1969), cert.
denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (No. 70-185); United States v.
Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1969); William B. Turner, 56 T.C. No. 3
(April 8, 1971); Virgil Q. Pemberton, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 875 (1970). But see

note 90 supra.

101407 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1969).
1023 89 U.S. 299 (1967).
103
See text accompanying notes 54-85 supra.
04

1 See note 78 supra.
105 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962).
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as non-deductible commuting unless the taxpayer spends the night.10 6
This new approach is a complete abandonment of the Hartsell
rationale and since it is based on Correll appears erroneous.
In another post-Correll decision, Edmerson v. United States, 07 the
District Court of Washington allowed government employees who
were not permitted to live at the job site to deduct their commuting
expenses. In Edmerson the court recognized that Correll was not
applicable to one-day trip transportationexpenses. 10 8 The court rejected the Tax Court decision in Raymond A. Sanders,10 9 and followed
the Hartsell case even though in Edmerson the employment was
permanent. However, because the Edmerson case is appealable to the
Ninth Circuit, it is now effectively overruled by that court's decision
in Sanders v. Commissioner.1- 0
162(a) (2)
This factual situation arises where a taxpayer maintains his residence centrally to several distant work sites and commutes daily from
his residence to one of the sites. Although this is a relatively untried
area, the possibilities for obtaining a deduction appear to be favorable.
The only case directly illustrative is Carlson v. Wright,' which involved a construction worker who was employed at a series of
temporary jobs surrounding his residence. However, the theory appears equally applicable to an employee who's residence is centrally
located with respect to a number of work locations he regularly visits
as part of his permanent employment duties. The Carlson court
reasoned that since the taxpayer resided centrally to various work
sites, so that his commuting expenses could not possibly be minimized
by moving his residence, the expenses were deductible.
CENTRALLY LOCATFD REsmENcE-§

106 In United States v. Taufemer, 407 F.2d 243, 246 (10th Cir. 1969), the
Tenth Circuit expressed the current attitude of the courts:
The basic and unmodified fact of whether the taxpayer is going to the
place where he begins work or is returning from the place where he
ceases work should be determinative. Such travels are expenses within
section 262 as "personal, living or family expenses" whether in an urban,
suburban, or rural setting. They are not ordinary business expenses
under section 162(a).
107 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-1263 (D.C. Wash. 1970).
108 The taxpayers in this case are not seeking to deduct expenses incurred for meals and lodging. Although Sanders [Raymond A. Sanders, 52
T.C. 964 (1969)] would equate meals (as in Correll) to traveling exenses (as in Hartsell) that legal computation has not yet been approved
y the Ninth Circuit and until it is, Hartsellremains the law and will be
applied in this case. Id. at 70-1264.
10952 T.C. 964 (1969), aff'd 439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (No. 70-185).
110 439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'g 52 T.C. 964 (1969), cert. denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971) (No. 70-185).
111 181 F. Supp. 568 (D. Idaho 1959).
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Carlson suggests a fair and workable approach to the problems in
the commuting area in general, as well as to the central location
aspect. 112 The court advocated abandoning technical definitions of
"home" as the test of deductibility in the commuting area, and substituting a consideration of whether under all the circumstances the
expense was dictated by the exigencies of business.113 First, the court
recognized the general proposition that a taxpayer should not be
entitled to deduct expenses of commuting within his city or general
work area. 114 Second, the court would require that a taxpayer move
as close as possible to his job" 5 and in this regard, case law indicates
112Carlson v. Wright, 181 F. Supp. 568 (D. Idaho 1959).
It is settled that a taxpayer cannot deduct expenses incurred in
traveling between his home and his place of business when both are
located in the city or area. Such expenses are "commuting" expenses
and are not incurred "while away from home". Id. at 573.
[W]here a taxpayer is employed on a job o _indeterminate or substantial duration, he cannot claim as ordinary md necessary expenses
those which could be avoided by residing in prc, mity to his job. Where,
however, a taxpayer's employment generally rvolves a series of jobs,
and he resides centrally to such jobs, travel expenses incurred in traveling
between the taxpayer's home and a "temporary" job outside of the town
or area where the taxpayer maintains his residence may be regarded as
due to the exigencies of the taxpayer's trade or business and is deductible.
Id. at 574.
118 The court stated:
Although in many of the cases, considerable discussion has revolved
around the meaning of "home" as used in section 162, the Court believes,
as is suggested by the opinion in Barnhill v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 913 (4th
Cir. 1945), that the actual problem should be determined not by reference
to a technical definition of the word "home," but rather by a consideration
of whether, under the circumstances a particular expense may properly
be considered an ordinary and necessary expense due to the exigencies of
the taxpayer's trade or business and incurred in the pursuit thereof while
away from the town or area where the taxpayer resides and maintains his
permanent residence. Carlson v. Wright, 181 F. Supp. 568, 573 (D. Idaho
1959).
114 This is in accord with the generally accepted proposition that transportation to and from work in the taxpayer's general work area is a non-deductible commuting expense. Rev. Rul. 55-236, 1955-1 Cum. BunL. 274; Amorso v. Comm'r,
193 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1952); R. C. Musser, 3 B.T.A. 498 (1925); Joseph M.
Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959); Frank N. Smith, 21 T.C. 991 (1953); Raymond E.
Kershner, 14 T.C. 168 (1950); Harold R. Johnson, 17 T.C. 1261 (1951).
115 This was also suggested in Comm'r v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 298 (1967)
(Mr.Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Fortas concurred, dissenting):
If the taxpayer chooses to maintain his residence at a place far removed from his place of business, the travel expenses are not "ordinary
and necessary" since not dictated by business needs. Comm'r v. Flowers,
326 U.S. 465 (1946). On the other hand, if the taxpayer cannot
reasonably maintain his residence at his place of business, the travel
expenses are "ordinary and necessary" and hence deductible. Such an
interpretation would give effect to the Congressional policy of allowing
a deduction for expenses dictated by the needs of the taxpayers employment.
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that when housing is merely scarce the test would not be satisfied. 116
In the central location situation the taxpayer would satisfy the second
criterion simply by showing that he resided centrally in relation to two
or more jobs. Under Carlson,the temporary-indefinite test should also
be employed in keeping with the theory that the employee should not
be expected to uproot his family and move his residence to an employment location of relatively short duration. 117 The result of the first
provision would be to prevent the deduction of any commuting within
the taxpayer's general employment area, and the second would test
whether the commuting was the result of personal choice." 8 When
applied to a specific commuting situation these provisions would
allow a deduction for expenses dictated by business needs but prevent
deduction of any expenses resulting from personal choice. Under this
approach the deduction could be allowed as an "ordinary and necessary"
business expense under § 162(a) although it borrows from judicially
created exceptions to the "commuter rule" developed under § 162(a)(2).
Using § 162(a) as a basis for the deduction would eliminate the
problem created by the courts reading Correll as applying the "overnight rule" to one-day trip commuting costs, since the "overnight rule"
only applies to the "away from home" provisions of § 162(a) (2).
Although Carlson v. Wright'" is the only case directly illustrating
the central location concept, there have been cases which indirectly
support the theory. In two recent decisions' 2 0 the Tax Court disallowed
deductions as personal commuting expenses when the taxpayers could
have avoided the costs by residing in central proximity to their job
sites. These cases appear to suggest that commuting costs incurred by
taxpayers residing centrally to their job sites will be deductible. There
are also analogous situations where the taxpayer is "away from home"
overnight and incurs meals and lodging as well as transportation
expenses. In these situations the taxpayer has widely separated
places of employment and his "tax home" is considered the area of his
residence even if it is not his principle place of employment, or indeed
a place of employment at all. 21 ' In Revenue Ruling 71-247,122 the
11o See note 93 supra.
117

Note 96 supra.

118 See The 1963 Proposal of the Treasury Department, Hearings on the
President's 1963 Tax Message before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 98 (1963).
119 181 F. Supp. 568 (D. Idaho 1959).
120 Joseph J. Bunevith, 52 T.C. 837 (1969); Harold Gilburg, 55 T.C. 611
(1971).
1321 Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-23 I.R.B. June 7, 1971; Burns v. Cray, 287 F.2d
698 (6th Cir. 1961);'Pierce v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 165 (D.C. Ark. 1961).
122 Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-23 I.R.B. June 7, 1971.
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Internal Revenue Service ruled that where a taxpayer maintains his
residence somewhere in a widely separated work area his residence
will be considered his "tax home" for purposes of the § 162(a) (2)
meal and lodging deduction.123 Presumably, if the taxpayer in Carlson
had spent the night at his work area, his residence would have been
considered his "tax home" under Revenue Ruling 71-247, and his meals
and lodging deductible under § 162(a) (2). Assuming that under
the Correll124 holding the "overnight rule" is not applicable to one-day
trip transportation expenses, Revenue Ruling 71-247 would seem to
support a deduction under § 162(a) (2) when a factual pattern similar
to that of Carlsonarises.
TEMPORARY EmpLoymNT-§

162(a) (2)

When a taxpayer accepts employment away from his residence
which is "temporary" as distinguished from "indefinite" or permanent,
he is entitled to deduct the expenses of commuting from his residence
to the temporary work site if the job is located outside of his general
working area. 20 Employment will be considered "temporary" if at its
inception it is expected to last less than one year. 12 The reason behind
this rule is that the taxpayer cannot reasonably be expected to move
127
his residence to a distant employment location of short duration.
Although the "temporary" exception to the "commuter rule" was first
recognized in connection with the "overnight rule,"128 it has also been
applied to the one-day trip.129 The Internal Revenue Service has
30
recognized the exception in IRS Publication No. 17 which states:1
"If you have a temporary or minor assignment beyond the general
area of your tax home, and return home each evening, you can
1954, § 162(a) (2) note 1 supra.
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967). See text accompanying

123 INT. REv. CODE OF
24

1

notes 25
57-82 supra.
1 INTERNAL PtvNuE SEavicE PuB. No. 17, YouR FDaERAL INcomE TAX 57

(1972 ed.).
126 See note 96 supra.
127

Harvey v. Comm'r, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960); Barnhill v. Comm'r,

148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945); Arthur Sansone, 41 T.C. 277 (1963).
128 Harry F. Schurer, 3 T.C. 544 (1944); E. G. Leach, 12 T.C. 20 (1949);
Peurifoy v. Comm'r, 358 U.S. 59 (1959), aff'g 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957), re g
27 T.C. 149 (1956).
129

Cockrell v. Comm'r, 321 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1963).

Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962); Berhow v. United

States, 279 F. Supp. 737 (D. Neb. 1968); Carlson v. Wright, 181 F. Supp. 568

(D.C. Idaho 1959); cf. Crowther v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1959);
Mathews v. Comm'r, 310 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), re'g 36 T.C.
483 (1961).
130

INTERNAL REvuNm SERvicE Put.

(1972 ed.).

No. 17, Yomi FEDERAL INcolm:

TAx 57
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deduct the expenses of the daily round trip transportation." 131 One
of the cases illustrative is Wright v. Hartse l132 where the taxpayer

drove 140 miles round trip in commuting daily to his worksite. The
court approved a deduction for the "temporary" portion of the employment but denied it when the employment became "indefinite." The
deduction was disallowed for the latter because the taxpayer could
reasonably be expected to move closer to an employment location of
substantial duration. 13s In the more recent case of Berhow v. United
States3 4 a federal district court upheld the temporary-indefinite
rule with respect to one-day trip commuting expenses, and also
concluded that United States v. Correl135 did not change the result.136

The court held that while Correll firmly established the "overnight
rule" with respect to meal expenses incurred "while away from home,"
"its reasoning lacks equal force" in the one-day trip situation. 37 The
Berhow court recognized the logical inconsistency in applying the
"overnight rule"to one-day trip commuting expenses when it stated
that if § 162(a) (2) would "justify a deduction for the meals and
lodging expense" of a taxpayer who establishes a temporary residence,
"why should the taxpayer be penalized for having chosen the alternative" of commuting over a long distance. 38 Favoring the result reached
in Berhow, pre-Correll cases' 39 consistently upheld § 162(a) (2) as
authority for the deduction of one-day trip transportation costs incurred in commuting to a "temporary" assignment. 140 Also, litigation
arising under § 22(n) of the 1939 Code culminating in Revenue Ruling
31
1 INTERNAL REVENUE SERviCE PuB. No. 17, Youa FEDERAL TAX 57 (1972
ed.). See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PuB. No. 463, TnAVEL ENTERTAn'MENT
ANm G=r EXPENSEs 8 (1970).

132 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962). Wright v. Hartsell also involved the
remote area exception to the "commuter rule." See notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra.
'3 See notes 127 & 112 supra.
134 279

F. Supp. 737 (D. Neb. 1968).
135 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
3

1 6 Berhow v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 737 (D. Neb. 1968):

[We do not believe that the fact that the taxpayer chose to commute
rather than establish a temporary "home" at the job site alters this result. While the "overnight rule" is firmly established with regard to meals
away from home [citing Correll] its reasoning lacks equal force in this
situation. If the temporary and unusual nature of the employment would
justify a deduction for the meals and lodging expense of establishing a
temporary residence, why should the taxpayer be penalized for having
chosen the alternative of having commuted over a long distance. Id. at
740. Cf. Edmerson v. United States, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-1263 (D.C. Wash.
1970).
7
13 Berhow v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 737, 740 (D. Neb. 1968).

'38 Id.
139
See notes 65 & 78 supra.
140 See note 78 supra.
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60-147141 suggests likewise since these cases held the "overnight rule"
inapplicable to the one-day trip.
Even after Correll various Internal Revenue Service publications
continue to recognize the validity of the "temporary" assignment
commuting deduction.1 42 Unfortunately the Tax Court in recent
decisions has reached the opposite result.143 In William B. Turner4
the taxpayer worked on two separate "temporary" jobs, had no more
than a six month employment commitment, and made daily round trips
from his residence to work and back of 72 and 120 miles. The Tax
Court in disallowing the commuting expenses relied on Correll and
held that § 162(a)(2) was unavailable in the case of one-day trips.
After rejecting § 162(a) (2) the Turner court denied applicability of
the "temporary" theory to § 162(a), stating that "the concepts of
'temporary' and 'indefinite' are of little or no value in distinguishing
[deductible] transportation expenses from [non-deductible] 'commuting' expenses." 45 In support of this conclusion the court illustrated
its reasoning by way of an example:
The illogic and unfairness of differentiating between temporary
and permanent employment with respect to commuting expenses
can be illustrated by this example: Suppose the Petitioner's next
door neighbor, Mr. Smith, is a permanent employee [and Petitioner
is a temporary employee at the same firm]. Petitioner and Mr.
Smith drive 60 miles to work together, each using his automobile
on alternative days. Would it make sense to allow Petitioner a
deduction for his commuting expenses and deny a deduction to Mr.
Smith because Petitioner is a temporary employee and Mr. Smith is
a permanent employee? Certainly not.146
The court's example not only ignores a substantial amount of precedent
but also the basic premise of the temporary-indefinite theory, which
is the reasonableness of expecting a taxpayer to move his residence
to a temporary location, and can be easily distinguished on this basis.
In the example, Mr. Smith was a permanent employee who could
have easily moved his residence closer to his job, and thereby minimize
his daily travel. Since he choose to reside 30 miles from his job the
resulting commuting expense was clearly personal and not deductible.
Contrawise, Petitioner's commuting was dictated by the exigencies ol
1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 682. See notes 65 & 71 supra.
1 See note 131 supra.
143 William B. Turner, 56 T.C. No. 3 (April 8, 1971); Virgil Q. Pemberton,
29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 875 (1970). Cf. Sanders v. Comm'r, 439 F.2d 296 (1971);
United States v. Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1969); Irvin 0. Crist, 29 CCH
Tax Ct. Mere. 510 (1970); Max C. Tiejen, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 281 (1970).
14456 T.C. No. 3 (April 8, 1971).
141
42

145

Id.

146 William B. Turner, 56 T.C. No. 3 n. 1 (April 8, 1971).

19721]

1972
COMMENTrS

business. The nature of his employment carried him to distant work
sites and he could not reasonably be expected to move his residence
to widely scattered "temporary" jobs which lasted no longer than six
months.1 47 The dissent in Turner criticized the result of the majority
as erroneous on two counts. First, the dissent argued that the Commissioner admitted applicability of the temporary-indefinite test in his
brief and therefore the majority's holding was beyond the issues
presented. The dissent also objected to the majority's abandonment of
"the Commissioners... long-standing" recognition 148 of the temporaryindefinite rule in factual situations similar to that in Turner.The dissent
stated the test of deductibility in these situations should remain: "(1)
whether the taxpayer's employment was temporary and (2) whether
that employment was located outside of the general area of his employment." 49 The Turner dissent also suggests the deduction could
be allowed under either § 162(a) or § 162(a) (2), thereby eliminating
the temporary-indefinite rule from the problems created by the courts
interpreting United States v. Correll'50 as applying the "overnight rule"
to one-day trip commuting costs.
CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing it is evident that as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Correll,'51 the "commuting" area
has been left confused with respect to one-day trip commuting
situations arising under § 162(a) (2). Prior to Correll, the courts had
created exceptions to the "commuter rule" under § 162(a) (2) based
on logic and fairness to the taxpayer. Correll was not intended to
destroy these exceptions but was aimed only at the specific subject of
meals. Hopefully, the courts will take cognizance of the actual holding
of Correll and structure their decisions in keeping with the Congressional policy of allowing deductions for all business related expenditures. Perhaps the best solution would be for Congress to establish
some statutory guidelines to effectuate this policy. Such a solution was
147 The Court's rule will also discourage taxpayers from accepting temporary
employment when employment in their home area is scarce. Is it better that taxpayer's remain unemployed? Unemployment compensation is tax free income.
148 For specific situations in which the Commissioner has recognized the
temporary test see Rev. Rul. 53-190, 1953-2 Cum. BUL=. 30. (construction workers
on temporary project 18 miles from city allowed deduction); Rev. Rul. 55-09,
1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 261 (army reservists allowed deduction in attending reserve
meetings). See also Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 75 (allowing weekend

commuting),

William B. Turner, 56 T.C. No. 3 (April 8, 1971) (Quealy, J., dissenting).
150 U.S. v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
'49

151

Id.
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proposed in the Presidents 1968 Tax Message'5 2 which noted the
necessity for legislation due to the lack of certainty and uniformity

in this area. Briefly, it provided for a 20 mile radius designated as
the "duty area" inside of which no commuting would be deductible.
This "duty area" would center around the taxpayer's principle post of
duty, or in the proper circumstances, around his residence. The

proposal also recognized the "temporary" employment exception in
situations in which the employment lasted less than one year. Hopefully, as a result of Correll, Congress will now take the initiative and
provide some relief to the taxpayer who does not wish to spend the
night.
Philip W. Moss

LABOR LAW-RAILWAY LABOR ACT § 2 (FIRST) GOOD
FAITH PROVISION: ACCOMMODATION OR RETURN
TO JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN LABOR DISPUTES

The paramount objectives of the Railway Labor Act1 [hereinafter
RLA] are to avoid any interruption in interstate commerce and to
promote harmony between the carriers and their employees by estab2
lishing collective bargaining machinery designed to prevent strikes.
To effectuate these objectives, Congress, in § 2 of the RLA, set forth
152 The 1963 Proposalof the Treasury Department,Hearings on the President's
Tax Message before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 98 (1963).

1Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 [codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88

(1964)].

Id. § 151(a) sets forth the general purposes of the RLA as follows:
The purposes of the chapter are:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of
any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom
of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization;
(3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of
this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of
all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5)
to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing
out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions....
See Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548, 565 (1930).
2

